University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Work

2010

When a Monopolist Deceives
Maurice Stucke

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stucke, Maurice, "When a Monopolist Deceives" (2010). UTK Law Faculty Publications. 789.
https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs/789

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Work at Legal Scholarship Repository: A
Service of the Joel A. Katz Law Library. It has been accepted for inclusion in UTK Law Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law Library. For more
information, please contact eliza.boles@utk.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Wed Apr 13 14:15:15 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Maurice E. Stucke, When an Monopolist Deceives, 76 Antitrust L.J. 823 (2010).
ALWD 7th ed.
Maurice E. Stucke, When an Monopolist Deceives, 76 Antitrust L.J. 823 (2010).
APA 7th ed.
Stucke, M. E. (2010). When an monopolist deceives. Antitrust Law Journal, 76(3),
823-846.
Chicago 17th ed.
Maurice E. Stucke, "When an Monopolist Deceives," Antitrust Law Journal 76, no. 3
(2010): 823-846
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Maurice E. Stucke, "When an Monopolist Deceives" (2010) 76:3 Antitrust LJ 823.
AGLC 4th ed.
Maurice E. Stucke, 'When an Monopolist Deceives' (2010) 76(3) Antitrust Law Journal
823
MLA 9th ed.
Stucke, Maurice E. "When an Monopolist Deceives." Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 76, no.
3, 2010, pp. 823-846. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Maurice E. Stucke, 'When an Monopolist Deceives' (2010) 76 Antitrust LJ 823
Provided by:
University of Tennessee College of Law Joel A. Katz Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

WHEN A MONOPOLIST DECEIVES
MAURICE E. STUCKE*

Although U.S. federal courts frequently address whether a monopolist's deception violates the federal competition laws,1 the legal standards they employ to evaluate such deception differ. Some courts
readily condemn a monopolist's. deceptive advertising. Others presume
that a monopolist's deceptive advertising has a de minimis effect on
competition. Since I discuss in greater detail elsewhere a monopolist's
deception in various contexts, including deceptive product announcements (vaporware) and in standard-setting organizations,2 this essay uses
one context-a monopolist's deceptive advertising or product disparagement-to illustrate how competition authorities and courts should
evaluate a monopolist's deception under the federal antitrust laws.

* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Senior Fellow, American Antitrust Institute. This essay is derived from a longer article, Maurice E. Stucke, How
Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm's Deception?, 63 SMU L. REV.
(forthcoming July 2010) (draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395076). I wish to
thank for their helpful comments Matthew Bester, Theodore R. Bolema, Max Huffman,
Mark Lemley, Dee Pridgen, Gary A. Pulsinelli, Christopher L. Sagers, Steven C. Salop,
Anne-Lise Sibony, Gregory M. Stein, Robert L. Steiner, Spencer Weber Waller, Dick
Wirtz, the editors of the Antitrust Law Journal,and the participants of the Issues at the
Forefront of Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance conference sponsored by Haifa
University and Loyola University Chicago (May 2009). I also thank the University of Tennessee College of Law and the W. Allen Separk Faculty Endowment for the summer research grant.
I In the United States, private plaintiffs bring most federal antitrust claims.
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL. JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl. 5.41 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen
Maguire eds., 2008), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412008.pdf.
The FTC survey of private Section 2 claims decided between January 2000 and July 1,
2007, identified "Business Torts" as the third most popular theory of liability (following
"Other" and "Refusals to Deal with Non-Rivals" categories). William F. Adkinson, Jr. et al.,
Enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Theory and Practice,at tbl. 2 (FIC Working Paper
2008), available at http://ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/section2overview.pdf.
2 Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a DominantFirm's
Deception?, 63 SMU L. REv. (forthcoming July 2010).
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I. COMBATING DECEPTION: DECEPTION AND ITS HARMS
Deception means "[k] nowingly and willfully making a false statement
or representation, express or implied, pertaining to a present or past
existing fact."3 Deception includes knowingly withholding facts basic to
a transaction.

4

Deception does not occur in a perfectly competitive market, which
has transparent prices, highly elastic demand curves, easy entry and exit,
and perfectly informed, profit-maximizing buyers and sellers, who are so
numerous that each can act as a price-taker. Similarly, in the perfectly
competitive marketplace of ideas, truth quickly and costlessly prevails
through "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources." 5 Consequently, deception requires two important deviations from the competitive ideal: (1) falsity is not quickly
exposed in the marketplace of ideas, 6 and (2) competition itself cannot
work perfectly. Market participants do not act with full and perfect
knowledge (either buyers or sellers know less than their counterpart)
and enter suboptimal transactions (or forgo transactions altogether).
Deception's anticompetitive effects include
7
* raising the search costs for consumers in choosing products;

" leaving consumers who purchased the wrong or inferior product
worse off;8
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 406 (6th ed. 1990).
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (e) (1977).

5 Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (explaining that the essential goal
of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is promoting a marketplace of ideas by
restricting governmental restraints on speech and achieving "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources").
6 See Robert H. Lande, Market Power Without a Large Market Share: The Role of Imperfect
Information and Other "Consumer Protection" Market Failures (AAI Working Paper No. 07-06,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1103613. For the role of antitrust in preventing market failure in the marketplace of ideas, see Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes,
Toward A Better Competition Policy for the Media: The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies
that Support the Media Sector's Unique Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REv. 101 (2009);
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST
L.J. 249 (2001).
7 Deception, for example, can cause consumers to disregard valuable and truthful information (such as the product's brand name) and rely on more expensive, time-consuming product searches. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 cmt. a
(1995); Robert Prentice, Vaporware:Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability
in a Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 1163, 1234 (1996); Gwendolyn Bounds, As EcoSeals Proliferate,So Do Doubts, WALL ST.J., Apr. 2, 2009, at Dl. This effect of deception was a
concern when a competitor palmed off its goods as that of its competitors. See Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
8 See Prentice, supra note 7, at 1234.
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" increasing the transaction costs for honest sellers to differentiate
their products and to reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with their desirable products;
" raising rival's costs (in having to respond to a competitor's deceptiice statements);
" creating market distortions and causing a deadweight welfare loss as
consumers forgo or minimize purchases; 9
* tipping sales to the deceptive firm, which in markets with network
effects can lead to the exercise of monopoly power;
" increasing entry barriers for new products (whose qualities and
risks cannot be quickly assessed);I0
" preventing some markets or services (such as standard setting) from
developing; and
" creating "lemon" markets where lower-quality goods or services
drive out higher-quality goods or services, thereby inhibiting innovation in these markets.
Deception lacks any redeeming economic qualities or cognizable efficiency justifications. 2 Consequently, competition law and consumer

9 See Harry S. Gerla, FederalAntitrust Law and the Flow of Consumer Information, 42 SvAL. REv. 1029, 1056 (1991).
10 See id. at 1068.

CUSE

iiSee ROBERT

S. PINDYCK

& DANIEL L.

RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcs

619 (7th ed. 2009);

George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970).
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977) ("[N]o interest of society is
served by promoting the flow of information not genuinely believed by its maker to be
true."); ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE pt. II ch. IX § 17 (4th ed. 1932)
("As a rule, however, the social net product of any dose of resources invested in a deceptive activity is negative. Consequently, as with bargaining, no tax that yields a revenue,
though it may effect an improvement, can provide a complete remedy, and absolute prohibition of the activity is required."); Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTiTRUST L.J. 975, 977 (2005); A Program Proposed by the Am. Med. Ass'n & the Chicago
Med. Soc'y Involving Peer Review of Physician Fees Is Not Likely to Violate Fed. Antitrust
Laws, 117 F.T.C. 1091, 1097-98 (FTC Advisory Op. 1994) ("Nothing in the antitrust laws
prohibits competitors from engaging in self-regulation to protect consumers from fraud,
deception, undue influence, and other abusive practices. Such regulation is likely to promote, rather than impede, competition, by enabling consumer purchase decisions to be
made free from deceptive practices. Such practices distort the operation of a market
economy, and their elimination enhances competition and consumer welfare.") (citing
Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1009 (1979) (explaining that rules banning false or deceptive advertising and unfair solicitation may enhance competition)).
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protection policy reinforce each other: both empower consumers to exercise the power of informed choice.13
II. FALSE ADVERTISING AND PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT
Today some U.S. federal courts applying the Sherman Act readily condemn a monopolist's deception involving advertising and product disparagement, while others are reluctant to condemn it. Nearly every
court recognizes, however, that a monopolist's deceptive advertising and
product disparagement under certain factual circumstances can violate
the federal antitrust laws.' 4 A more restrictive view of deception by a
monopolist as a Sherman Act-violation is taken by Professors Areeda,
Turner, and later Hovenkamp in their Antitrust Law treatise (the Treatise). 5 Even the Treatise recognizes, however, that the antitrust laws extend to deception.16 The U.S. Courts of Appeals in the Second, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits rely upon the Treatiseand presume that the competitive harm from deception is generally de minimis, but other circuits do
not have such a presumption. The difference, then, among the courts is
the legal standard for-evaluating deceit by a monopolist under the antitrust laws.
Because the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, besides citing the Treatise, offer little, if any, independent analysis for their presumptions and
elements, 7 this section will focus primarily on the Treatise. The three
circuits have never examined critically, as this essay does, the Treatise's
presumption. Those circuits have never inquired whether the presumption against competitive harm, and the six elements offered by the Trea13See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The PracticalReason for Both
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 44, 44 (1998); Neil W.
Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer
Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 713 (1997).
14As one district court recently noted: "One approach, followed by the Seventh Circuit
...
is that false and defamatory statements never constitute a violation of the antitrust
laws." West Penn Allegheny Health Sys. v. UPMC, No. 09-0480, 2009 WL 3601600, at *35
(W.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Sanderson v. Culligan Int'l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir.
2005)). Judge Easterbrook's assumption of a self-correcting and self-policing marketplace
of ideas, however, is sui generis.
15 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1 782b, at 326-31 (3d ed. 2008).
16See id. at 326.
'7 See Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric
Surgery, 323 F.3d 366, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2003); Am. Prof'l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof I Publ'ns, Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 1997);
Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 916-17 (2d Cir. 1988). Cf Patricia Schultheiss & William E. Cohen, Cheap Exclusion: Role & Limits 18 (FTC Working Paper 2009) (noting how courts rarely find a Section 2 violation based solely on false
statements in public advertisements or comments that disparage a rival or its products),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/dos/section2cheapexclusion.pdf.
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tise to overcome the presumption, can be reconciled with the Sherman
Act's legislative aim.
In fact, the Treatise's legal presumption came into antitrust jurisprudence largely via the Second Circuit's dictum in one footnote.' 8 In Berkey
Photo, Kodak indicated on its Kodacolor II film boxes that its film had a
fourteen-month shelf life, when the film actually lost half its speed
within three to six months. 9 The Second Circuit held that it need not
decide whether this amounted to deceptive advertising or whether and
under what circumstances such deception might violate Section 2.20 The
court added, in dicta, that "It] he Sherman Act is not a panacea for all
evils that may infect business life." 21 And if the court were to decide the
issue, it would most likely follow the Treatise and require the antitrust
plaintiff to overcome a presumption that such practice had a de minimis
22
effect on competition.
Nearly a decade later, the Second Circuit in Ayerst cited the dictum
23
and adopted, without any analysis, Areeda and Turner's six elements.
The Ninth Circuit, thereafter, simply cited Ayerst and the Treatise, without offering any independent rationale. 24 The Sixth Circuit likewise followed the Ninth and Second Circuits' adoption of the presumption, but
formally required only two of the six elements. 25 The Second and Ninth
Circuits' earlier legal analysis was so deficient that the Sixth Circuit
found it "unclear whether [the Second Circuit] thought each requirement was mandatory." 26 Thus, the Sixth Circuit stated that all six factors
were relevant, but declined, given the facts before the lower court on
summary judgment, to consider each element or hold that an antitrust
plaintiff must satisfy all six elements to rebut its newly adopted de
Is See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 288 n.41 (2d Cir. 1979).
A few days before Berkey Photo, a district court also, without much analysis, cited the Treatise's presumption and elements. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168,
180-81 (D. Del. 1979). The court simply said such deception, "even if taken in concert,
however, must be subject to a de minimis rule, if the antitrust courts are not to become
the battleground for a variety of intentional-tort suits." Id at 180. Subsequent courts have
not cited Pezetel as their basis for adopting the Treatise.
'9 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 288 n.41.
20 Id.
21 Id.
2 Id.
23 See Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 916 (2d Cir. 1988).
24 See Am. Prof'l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Profi Publ'ns,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997).
25 See Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric
Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2003).
26

Id. at 371 n.7.
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minimis presumption. 7 Thus, in the Sixth Circuit, to survive summary
judgment, an antitrust plaintiff must show a genuine issue of material
fact regarding at least two elements: (1) the advertising was clearly false,
and (2) it would be difficult or costly for the plaintiff to counter the
28
false advertising.
Given this uncritical reliance on the Treatise, the basis for the three
circuits' legal presumption and rebuttal elements is infirm, if the Treatise's reasoning is infirm. Antitrust defendants will continue to urge
upon other courts outside these three circuits that they similarly adopt
the Treatise's presumption and elements. Some courts will be tempted to
follow the lead of these three circuits, especially since there is no alternative legal standard dealing specifically with a monopolist's deceit. In
this essay, I offer an alternative legal standard that is consistent with the
case law and the Sherman Act's legislative policies. Moreover, the three
circuits, prodded perhaps by the federal antitrust agencies, should critically evaluate their empirically unsupported legal presumption and infirm rebuttal elements.
A.

THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE THREE CIRCUITS'

LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF DE MINIMIS

HARM

Some U.S. courts recognize deceptive advertising and disparagement
of a competitor's product as generally indefensible, and readily condemn a monopolist's anticompetitive deceit. Although these courts do
not cite a legal standard specifically addressing a monopolist's deceit,
their results are generally consistent with Section 2's legislative aim and
the overall trend of taking a harder line against deceptive advertising
and promotions in the marketplace. But the courts in the Second, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits, following the Treatise, are reluctant to use the Sherman Act to punish such deception. Courts in these three circuits
adopted the Treatises legal presumption that a monopolist's deceptive
advertising and product disparagement have a de minimis impact on

27 Id. at 371.
28 Id. While recognizing that false advertising cannot benefit competition, the Sixth

Circuit felt that false advertising could not harm competition "unless it was so difficult for
the plaintiff to counter that it could potentially exclude competition." Id at 372.
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competition. 29 Several district courts outside these three circuits have
30
also cited, without expressly adopting, the factors.
The legal presumption of de minimis harm from deception makes
little economic sense (other than to deter injured victims from challenging a monopolist's deceit under the Sherman Act). First, the Treatise
does not provide empirical support for its presumption that monopolies' deceptive practices generally have a de minimis impact on competition. Legal presumptions that do not rest on "actual market realities are
generally disfavored in antitrust law." 31 Before adopting it, courts should
examine whether the presumption is empirically supported. The Treatise
only states that "[m]any buyers . ..recognize disparagement as nonobjective and highly biased,"32 while recognizing that this is not ajustification for "isolated" examples of falsehood. Consequently, according to
the Treatise, deception employed by a monopolist in disparaging a
33
smaller competitor's products "should presumably be ignored."
Second, besides lacking empirical support, the Treatise's assertion
does not make economic sense. If product disparagement is ineffectual,
why would any firm, much less a monopolist, engage in it? A rational
profit-maximizing monopolist recognizes that deceit has costs, including
the costs for the deceptive advertising and promotional campaign and
the potential loss of sales, goodwill, and competitive advantage, if the
deceit is discovered. A monopolist would not falsely disparage a rival's
products unless its anticipated gains (maintaining or attaining profits)
outweigh its costs. A profit-maximizer would not incur casually advertising costs to falsely disparage a rival's products and expose itself to cniminal and civil liability, if buyers, as the Treatise claims, dismiss such ads as
29American Council, 323 F.3d at 370; American Professional Testing, 108 F.3d at 1151; Nat'l
Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 916 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Alternative
Electrodes, LLC v. EMPI, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 322, 331-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 06-2057, 2007 WL 831806, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2007);
Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344 (D. Conn. 2004); Tate v. Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1079-80 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Avery Dennison Corp. v.
Acco Brands, Inc., No. 99-1877, 2000 WL 986995, at *21 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Multivideo
Labs., Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. 99-3908, 2000 WL 12122, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
'0 See L-3 Commc'ns Integrated Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 07-0341, 2008 WL
4391020, at *7-*8 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F.
Supp. 2d 146, 152 (D.D.C. 2008); Z-Tel Commc'ns, Inc v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 331 F.
Supp. 2d 513, 530-32 (E.D. Tex. 2004); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 85 F.
Supp. 2d 1130, 1158 (D. Kan. 2000); David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F.
Supp. 728, 749 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Leavitt, 865 F. Supp. 951, 963-64 (D.
Mass. 1994); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 180-81 (D. Del. 1979).
31 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992).
32 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
782d, at 332.
33Id. The Treatise recognizes a possible exception when the monopolist, because of its
market position, contracts to test or evaluate the product of a rival. Id. at 333.
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"nonobjective and highly biased." Accordingly, the Lanham Act recognizes that a competitor can profit in falsely disparaging a rival's product. 4 Indeed, a plaintiff under certain conditions can recover a
5
defendant's profits in addition to any damages a plaintiff sustained.
Third, the Treatise's presumption is inconsistent with the Sherman
Act's legislative aim to proscribe unfair methods of competition, 6 which
historically included a competitor's anticompetitive deception. By definition, maintaining a monopoly through false, misleading, and deceptive advertising is unfair competition. 3v The Treatise recognizes that
deception lacks any redeeming virtue, but points to the social costs in
litigating it.38 The evidence, however, suggests that despite the extensive
federal and state legislation, fraud is under- rather than over-litigated.3 9
In defense of the presumption, the Ninth Circuit quoted an earlier
edition of the Treatise, which stated that the tort of product disparagement was difficult to prove at common law and thus generally disfavored. 40 This argument ignores the tort's origin. Its requirement of
special damages arose-not from any judicial distrust of the tort of
product disparagement-but "as a result of the friction between the ecclesiastical and common law courts of England when the common law
courts sought to assume jurisdiction over actions for defamation." 41 Be- See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
35 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); see also Trilink Saw Chain, LLC v. Blount, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d
1293, 1322-24 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (citing factors as to when to award the defendant's
profits).
3621 CONG. REc. 3152 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar) (stating that the word "monopoly" is a "merely technical term which has a clear and legal signification," namely, "the
sole engrossing to a man's self by means which prevent other men from engaging in fair
competition").
37 See Int'l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1268 (8th Cir.
1980).
38 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
782b, at 326.
39 The FTC, for example, found that 13.5 percent of adults in the United States (30.2
million consumers) were the victim of one of sixteen types of fraud included in its 2005
survey. FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SECOND FTC
SuRvEY 55 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/10/fraud.pdf.
40
Am. Prof'l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l Publ'ns,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997); see 3 PHILLP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTiTRUST LAw
738c, at 280-81 (1978) ("Even at common law, this is 'a tort that never has
been greatly favored.'"). This language does not appear in the Treatise's third edition. See
3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 782d, at 332. .
41 Testing Sys., Inc. v. Magnaflux Corp., 251 F. Supp. 286, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1966). As the
court noted:
Until the 19th Century the requirement did not impose any untoward burden
on the litigant. The early business community was devoid of the complexities
that characterize the modern market place, and it was the rule, rather than the
exception, that tradesmen knew their customers well. It was not too difficult,
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cause "slander of any kind was a sin, church courts alone could punish
unless temporal damage could be shown to have resulted from the defamatory words. '42 Moreover, this argument does not account for the
later legislative policies, such as the Lanham Act and state Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP) laws, 43 which make prosecuting
deceptive conduct easier and increase private plaintiffs' economic incentives to bring product disparagement cases.
Fourth, the Treatise's presumption is inconsistent with other U.S. congressional directives regarding false advertising claims. Both the Sherman and Lanham Acts address unfair competition. Under the Lanham
Act, courts "routinely presume that literally false [comparative] advertising actually deceives consumers. '44 But when evaluating the same false
advertising under the Sherman Act, a court, in applying the Treatise's
therefore, to determine just when and why one's customers began to favor a
competitor.
As is so often the case, however, the rule respecting special damages continued
in force long after its raison d'etre had passed.
ld.
42 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Note, Injury Trade Relations by a Non-Competitor,41 ILL.
L. REv. 661, 662 (1947)).
43See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104(b) (8) (2001) (prohibiting "[d]isparaging the
goods, services or business of another by false or misleading representations of fact");
REv. UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACrICES Acr § 2(a) (8) (1966), available at http://www.
law.upenn.edu/bill/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920-69/rudtpa66/htm.
44
Trilink Saw Chain, LLC v. Blount, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1320-21 (N.D. Ga.
2008) ("[A] growing number of courts have also adopted a presumption, in cases where
money damages are sought, that willfully deceptive, comparative advertisements cause financial injury to the party whose product the advertisement targets."); see alsoJohnson &
Johnson Vision Care v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (lth Cir. 2002)
("[O]nce a court deems an advertisement to be literally false, the movant need not present evidence of consumer deception."); Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth
Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 314-15 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[A]pplying a presumption of consumer deception to all literal falsity claims, irrespective of the type of relief sought, makes sense....
Common sense and practical experience tell us that we can presume, without reservation,
that consumers have been deceived when a defendant has explicitly misrepresented a fact
that relates to an inherent quality or characteristic of the article sold."); Porous Media
Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1336.(8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a predicate finding
of intentional deception, as a major part of the defendant's marketing efforts, contained
in comparative advertising, encompasses sufficient harm to justify rebuttable presumption
of causation and injury in fact); HipSaver Co. v.J.T. Posey Co., 497 F. Supp. 2d 96, 106-10
(D. Mass. 2007) (applying a rebuttable presumption of causation and injury for willful,
literally false comparative advertising in two-player market); lams Co. v. Nutro Prods., No.
00-566, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15134, at *14 (S.D. Ohio July 3, 2004) (noting that the
"assumed literal falsity of the statements in issue give rise to a presumption of actual deception" and "[i]n instances of comparative advertising, where the competitor's products
are specifically targeted, a plaintiff is also entitled to a presumption of money damages");
Heidi Ott A.G. v. Target Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1072 (D. Minn. 2001) ("[A] presumption of causation and injury sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to damages will arise if
the defendant deliberately engaged in deceptive comparative advertising.").
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presumption, would presume the contrary: namely, the same buyers recognize the disparagement as nonobjective and highly biased and thus
are not misled.
Cases exist where a company salesperson at a trade show casually disparages a competitor's products. The Treatise is justified in considering
such isolated comments as presumptively harmless. But courts typically
dismiss such opinions anyway. Puffery is not actionable under the common law, 45 FTC Act,46 state UDAP laws, 47 or Lanham Act. 48 Moreover, as
the Treatiserecognizes, deceptive statements are not per se illegal under
the Sherman Act. 49 Antitrust plaintiffs must prove the other Section 2
elements, including causation, antitrust injury, and damages.
B.

CRITIQUE OF THE Six ELEMENTS

To rebut its empirically unsupported presumption that deceptive advertising and product disparagement have a de minimis effect on competition, the Treatise requires an antitrust plaintiff to offer cumulative
proof as to six elements: "the representations were (1) clearly false, (2)
clearly material, (3) clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, (4)
made to buyers without knowledge of the subject matter, (5) continued
for prolonged periods, and (6) not readily susceptible of neutralization
or other offset by rivals." 50 Again neither the Treatise nor the courts
45For example, the Restatement explains:
A competitor is conditionally privileged to make an unduly favorable comparison of the quality of his own land, chattels or other things, with the quality of the
competing land, chattels or other things of a rival competitor, although he does
not believe that his own things are superior to those of the rival competitor, if
the comparison does not contain false assertions of specific unfavorable facts
regarding the rival competitor's things.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

46

OF TORTS

§ 649 (1977).

Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29
Fed. Reg. 8324, 8351 (1964) (explaining that puffing is "expressions the consumer clearly
understands to be pure sales rhetoric on which he should not rely in deciding whether to
purchase the seller's product").
47See, e.g., Evanston Hosp. v. Crane, 627 N.E. 2d 29, 36 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) ("Hospital's
various representations in its publications as to the care it would extend to its patients
were mere expressions of opinion or 'puffing' [which] are not actionable under the Consumer
Fraud Act.") (citations omitted).
48
Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding district court's finding that challenged statement was puffery, which cannot support Lanham Act claim).
49See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 782b, at 326-27 (applying a rebuttable
presumption, rather than a per se rule).
50Id at 327; see Am. Prof'l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal &
Prof'I Publ'ns, Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing factors). The Sixth Circuit
said that all six factors are relevant, but to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must
show a genuine issue of material fact that "(1) the advertising was clearly false, and (2) it
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adopting these six elements explain (1) how they arrived at these elements, (2) the empirical support for these elements, or (3) how these
elements further the Sherman Act's legislative aim, make any economic
sense, or can be reconciled with the common and statutory law on deception. The six elements go beyond what is required for a Section 5
claim under the FTC Act, the state UDAP laws, the Lanham Act, the
common law on unfair competition, and even common law fraud, and
do not significantly reduce the risk of false positives .5 1 Rather, in deterring victims from challenging a monopolist's anticompetitive deceit
under the Sherman Act, the six elements significantly increase the risk
of false negatives, are inconsistent with Section 2's legislative aim, and
make no economic sense.
As to the first three elements, it would be defensible if the Treatise
required that the deception be "clearly" anticompetitive to violate Section 2. But it makes no sense to require a monopolist's deception to be
"clearly" false, "clearly" material, and "clearly" likely to induce reasonable reliance under the Sherman Act. No such requirement exists under
the FTC and Lanham Acts, UDAP statutes, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), or common law fraud. It is hard
to fathom why the risk of false positives for claims of deception is greater
under the antitrust laws than under these other causes of action, especially when a plaintiff in a civil RICO action, or under some state UDAP
statutes, may recover treble damages and attorneys' fees (or punitive
damages under the common law). Courts deal with claims of deception
in many different contexts. Given the judiciary's long experience evaluating claims of deception, one would expect that the risk of false positives is lower for deception claims under the Sherman Act than for other
less familiar economic behavior, such as tying or bundled rebates.
Courts are comfortable sending a local shopkeeper to jail for deception
or awarding trebled RICO damages for fraudulent activity. It makes no
sense to impose the requirement "clearly" on these common law ele52
ments when a monopolist engages in similar deceit.
would be difficult or costly for the plaintiff to counter the false advertising." Am. Council
of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 323
F.3d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2003).
51See discussion infra Part III. False positives here involve finding antitrust liability for
restraints that are competitively neutral or procompetitive. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) ("Mistaken inferences and
the resulting false condemnations 'are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.'") (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
52Perhaps this element refers to state jurisdictions where a plaintiff must prove the
elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence. But this only requires that sufficient evidence exists to make that
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The Treatise's fourth element-requiring buyers to be "without knowledge of the subject matter"-motivates buyers either to remain ignorant
of the subject matter or to increase their search costs by verifying the
veracity of the monopolist's statement. A victim's general knowledge of
the subject matter should not absolve a monopolist of its deception. Accordingly, both common law fraud and the later federal and state laws
do not impose the Treatise's element. They focus on the actor's deception, rather than the victim's capacity to thwart the deception. Under
the common law, for example, market participants can "assume that a
representation of fact material in affecting his decision to engage or not
to engage in the particular transaction is honestly made" unless its falsity
is obvious or one is aware of specific facts that makes reliance unjustifiable.53 Even when victims could investigate "without any considerable
trouble or expense," 54 the common law does not impose a duty to
investigate.
One district court has noted the paradox. If sophisticated buyers have
general knowledge about the subject matter, they arguably would disfact highly probable, which differs from requiring the statement to be "clearly" false or
material. See 37 Am. JUR. 2n Fraud and Deceit § 493 (2001). A Westlaw search did not identify any state or federal judicial decision that used the Treatise's"clearly" false and misleading elements interchangeably with the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard. Even
if the Treatise'sclearly false and material elements were similar to some states' clear and
convincing evidentiary standard, the lower preponderance of evidence standard governs
federal civil antitrust claims. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d
214, 227 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the preponderance standard applies even in
civil cases that involve fraud). Moreover, Congress has chosen the preponderance standard in creating various substantive causes of action for fraud, including the Lanham Act.
See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1991) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c), the False
Claims Act, as one example of Congress choosing a preponderance standard for a substantive action for fraud); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-91
(1983) (applying a preponderance standard to civil enforcement of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96 (1981) (finding Congressional intent to apply a preponderance standard in administrative proceedings
concerning violation of antifraud provisions of the securities laws); SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943) (applying a preponderance standard in an action
brought under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933); First Nat'l Monetary Corp. v.
Weinberger, 819 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying preponderance standard
to civil fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act). Cf Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985) (suggesting that the preponderance standard applies to
civil RICO actions); World Wide Ass'n of Specialty Programs v. Pure, Inc., 450 F.3d 1132,
1140 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying preponderance standard to false advertising claims under
Lanham Act); Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302, 2006-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,364
(Aug. 2, 2006) (holding that the clear and convincing standard does not apply to the
elements of antitrust case because it happens to involve a patent and that "[n]o court has
held that clear and convincing evidence is required to establish Section 5 deception"); 21
C.J.S. Credit Reporting Agencies § 112, at 556 (2006) (explaining that proof by a preponderance of the evidence generally is sufficient for consumer protection statutes).
53
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541A cmt. a (1977).
54 Id. § 540 cmt. a.
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count (and possibly punish) any deception. Knowing that the buyer has
such knowledge, a rational monopolist would not deceive them.5 5 One
then can draw three conclusions: (1) the monopolist cannot differentiate between sophisticated and unsophisticated purchasers, (2) the monopolist predicted poorly its ability to deceive the victim, or (3) even56
sophisticated purchasers are at times overconfident and can be duped.
If the monopolist predicted poorly, then the monopolist-while morally
culpable-did not violate Section 2, as causation is missing. Otherwise,
the monopolist may be liable.
Fraud victims include corporations. 57 As Professor Robert Prentice
found, "[T] here is substantial empirical evidence that people are unable
to detect when they are being deceived, but, worse still, inaccurately believe that they can do so." 58 Monopolists may exploit such shortcomings
in the buyers' knowledge or reasoning. 59 In Conwood, for example, the
moist snuff monopoly was the category manager for moist snuff for
many retailers. 60 The plaintiff alleged, and the factfinder found, that the
monopolist abused its position as category manager by providing retailers misleading information. It wanted to dupe the retailers into believing, inter alia, that the monopolist's moist snuff products sold better
than the plaintiffs products, so that these retailers would carry the mo55 See Avery Dennison v. Acco Brands, No. 99-1877, 2000 WL 986995, at *21 (C.D. Cal.
2000)
(denying motion for summary judgment).
56
Some neo-classical economic theorists posit that sophisticated purchasers can use
their purchasing clout to avoid cartel prices, but the empirical evidence shows that even
corporate America pays supracompetitive prices as a result of price-fixing cartels. See Maurice E. Stucke, BehavioralEconomists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 Loy.
U. CHI. LJ. 513, 559-63 (2007).
57 Kristy Holtfreter et al., Sociolegal Change in ConsumerFraud:From Victim-Offender Interactions to Global Networks, 44 CRIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 251, 263 (2006); Michael Levi, WhiteCollar Crime Victimization, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 169, 172-73 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992) (majority of fraud victims in the United Kingdom were
corporate entities).
5 Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1663, 1759 (2003).
59 Max Huffman, Bridging the Divide? Theoriesfor IntegratingCompetition Law and Consumer

Protection,EUR.

COMPETITIONJ.

(forthcoming) (manuscript at 11-18), available at http://

ssrn.com/abstract- 1546106.
60 Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 775 (6th Cir. 2002). The court
describes the practice of category management as one that
varies from store to store, and involves managing product groups and business
units and customizing them on a store-by-store basis to satisfy customer demands. The process can determine the quantity of items a store sells. For instance, it allows retailers, based on such data as sales volume, to determine
which items should be allocated more shelf space. Manufacturers support the
efforts of retailers by presenting to them products or a combination of products
that are more profitable and "plan-o-grams" describing how, and which, products should be displayed.
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nopolist's moist snuff and discontinue carrying the plaintiff's products. 61
(The monopolist also tortiously removed, discarded, and destroyed the
plaintiffs point-of-sale advertising racks without the store management's
permission, and trained its employees to take advantage of inattentive
store clerks with various ruses, such as obtaining nominal permission to
reorganize or neaten the store racks in an effort to destroy the plaintiffs
racks.)
Under the Treatise's presumption and elements, which the Sixth Circuit subsequently adopted in part,62 the product disparagement claims
should have been summarily dismissed. 63 These retailers, which included Wal-Mart, knew the subject matter and sought to maximize profits from moist snuff sales through the optimal selection of products.
Retailers reviewed the monopolist's plan-o-gram proposals as to which
moist snuff products should be displayed, and how. Some retailers compared the category captain's proposals with their own independent analysis. 64 Moreover, a Kroger supermarket executive testified that any
manufacturer trying to use category management practices to control
65
competition in its stores would be "committing suicide."
Recognizing that falsely disparaging a competitor and its financial
condition can constitute exclusionary practices under Section 2, 66 the
Sixth Circuit in Conwood held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that these sophisticated retailers were indeed duped. The monopolist provided retailers "skewed" national sales figures, which did not
always represent local product movements in stores, and false information, such as inflated sales data, in order to get the retailers to maintain
the monopolist's poorly-selling items while dropping or "burying" the
plaintiff's better-selling products. 67 The plaintiffs expert testified that
retailers, while quite sophisticated, nonetheless knew less than the monopolist about the pricing and profitability of moist snuff. 8 The deception had its desired effect. If retailers actually preferred the

at 783.
Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric
Surgery, 323 F.3d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2003).
63 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
782a2, at 324-26.
61 Id.

62 Am.

64

Conwood, 290 F.3d at 775.

65 Id.
6 Id. at 788; see also id. at 784 (citing Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 854 n.30
(6th Cir. 1979)).
67 Conwood, 290 F.3d at 776, 786, 790.
68 Id. at 776. The court also relied on the testimony of the plainiffs marketing expert
that, by deceiving the retailers, the monopolist abused its position of trust as category
captain. Id. at 786.
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monopolist's slower-selling moist snuff products, the monopolist had no
need to deceive them.
The Treatise's fifth element-requiring the monopolist's misrepresentation to continue for prolonged periods-is arbitrary. One cannot assume that a monopolist's deception, once exposed and not repeated, is
harmless, or that prolonged deception is necessarily harmful. An effective lie need not be repeated to preempt a nascent competitive threatone misrepresentation may suffice. To increase its market power
through network effects, 69 a company may employ deceit to tip demand
toward its product. Once attaining a monopoly, the company need not
continue to employ deceit to maintain its power. Moreover, the courts
and Treatise never explain why society must endure a monopolist's deceit over a long, but not yet prolonged, period. The critical issue is
whether the misrepresentation reasonably appears capable of making a
significant contribution to maintaining or attaining monopoly powernot how often, or for how long, the monopolist deceived the
marketplace.70
Finally, the Treatise's sixth element-the misrepresentation is not
readily susceptible to neutralization or other offset by rivals-makes little sense. The Sixth Circuit surmised, based on this element, that false
advertising would not damage competition "unless it was so difficult for
the plaintiff to counter that it could potentially exclude competition."71
Again a rational profit-maximizing monopolist recognizes that deceit in69 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999). One complaint is that with its operating system monopoly (enforced by network effects), Microsoft
can ward off potential threats by adding (some assert tying) an imitation product. Consumers or OEMs are unlikely to incur the time or cost to add a second media player,
Internet browser, or spreadsheet or word processing program because Microsoft can tie
an imitation version to its operating system. Once Microsoft adds its version, as the European Commission found for media players, programmers will develop solutions for the
Microsoft platform because it will reach automatically 90 percent of client personal computer users and thus save the content providers the costs of supporting different technology platforms. Under this positive feedback loop, more users of a given software platform
lead to a greater incentive to develop products compatible with that platform, which reinforces that platform's popularity with end-users (and the software company's market
power). See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601 (Ct. First
Instance).
70 For example, a firm with market power might violate many laws that "have little or
nothing to do with its position in the market: an agricultural finn might fail to comply
with safety or cleanliness standards applicable to food processing; a computer processor
firm might violate employment discrimination laws; a pharmaceutical firm might run
afoul of the Food and Drug Administration's rules for approval of new drugs." Goldwasser
v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 400 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting these violations are too
attenuated to competition to support an antitrust claim).
71 Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric
Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2003).
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volves costs. If a smaller rival effectively can neutralize or offset the monopolist's misrepresentations with little cost and effort, neoclassical
economic theory predicts that there would be no benefit in engaging in
such deception. The monopolist risks the loss of its reputation, goodwill,
and sales, while incurring the costs of a futile advertising campaign.
Thus, a rational monopolist will attempt such deception only where the
likely gains exceed the costs (even if rivals attempt to counteract it). The
fact that a monopolist invested in a deceptive advertising campaign signals that, despite the attendant risks, the monopolist expected to benefit. Even if the monopolist is behaving irrationally, liability should not
depend on the rivals' actions. The courts should dismiss the Section 2
claim for lack of causation if the deception does not appear to be reasonably capable of making a significant contribution to attaining or
maintaining monopoly power.
By muddying the waters through deception, a monopolist, for example, can desensitize consumers to a competitor's advertised claim and
thereby blunt an entrant's ability to gain a competitive advantage based
on that advertised benefit. Suppose, for example, the dominant Internet
access provider deceptively advertises high-speed Internet connections
to maintain existing customers and enroll new ones. If sufficient widespread confusion ensues as to what constitutes high-speed Internet access and whether the monopoly or its smaller rivals offer faster Internet
connections, customers may distrust any competitor's claims about highspeed connections. 2
Even if smaller rivals could expose a monopolist's deception, why
should courts require them to incur such costs? This burden is inconsistent with the Sherman Act's purpose and contravenes the legal maxim
that the law helps those who are deceived, not those deceiving. 73 Sup72This theory arose in a case where a telephone monopolist furnished inside wire
maintenance service to its residential and certain business customers. Davis v. S. Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., No. 89-2839, 1994 WL 912242 (S.D. Fla. 1994). The plaintiffs alleged that the
monopolist created widespread confusion in the market, which thereby raised entry barriers. An entrant would have needed to engage in corrective advertising, which itself was
expensive. Second, the entrant, despite its corrective advertising efforts, had no assurance
of capturing all the business diverted from the monopoly. Customers could switch to another competitor. Third, given the low failure rate for a telephone wire, competitors
could not recoup quickly the cost of corrective advertising. Id. at *2. While questioning
the amount of evidence in support of the theory, the court accepted the plaintiffs' theory
of harm and denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' two
monopolization claims. Id. at *15.
73 One district court went so far afield as to hold that an antitrust plaintiff could not
prove an antitrust injury unless the competitor's deception "threatened to or was driving
[plaintiff] out of business." Xerox Corp. v. Media Sciences Int'l, 511 F. Supp. 2d 372, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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pose, for example, that a monopolist over several years sent the health
care community mass mailings that falsely disparaged a smaller rival.
Suppose the smaller rival could counter the monopolist's deception, as
was the case in American Council, by incurring the cost in responding to
the defendant's three mass mailings to between 7,000 and 8,000 hospitals and insurance companies. 74 Why should the law mandate such an
undertaking? The deception directly harms consumers and raises rivals'
corrective advertising costs. 75 Moreover, the fringe firm or new entrant is
situated differently than the monopolist. A monopolist would prefer an
entrant to expend capital defending its image, rather than in expanding
its business, thereby threatening the monopoly. Advertising can be an
effective entry barrier. 76 Generally, it is costlier for entrants to launch a
new product and establish brand recognition than for an entrenched
77
firm to maintain its brand awareness.
The sixth element, like the Treatise's general presumption, can cause
courts to draw inconsistent presumptions with respect to false advertising claims under the Sherman and Lanham Acts. When a firm disseminates willfully deceptive, comparative advertising, courts under the
Lanham Act do not require the competitor to show that the misrepresentation was not readily susceptible to neutralization or other offset.
74 See American Counci4 323 F.3d at 368.
75 See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed ProfitSacrifice Standard,73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 340 n.116 (2006); Prentice, supranote 7, at 1242.
76

Robert Smiley, Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence, 6 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG.
167, 171-72 (1988). The surveyed executives were asked separately, for new and existing
mature products, how frequently their company engages in certain behavior, including
advertising and promoting the product intensively for the purpose of creating sufficient
product loyalty that potential rivals would find entry less attractive. Of the seven entry
deterrence tactics identified, advertising was the most frequently employed tactic to deter
entry of new products, and the second most frequently employed tactic for existing products. Id. at 172.
77Prentice, supra note 7, at 1225 n.257 (collecting sources); see also U.S. Philips Corp. v.
Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding sufficient evidence from
which jury could conclude that entry barriers to the rotary electric shaver market are
substantial, if not high, because of "the need to have a well-known brand with wide consumer acceptance, the limited number of brands that satisfy this requirement, and the
substantial advertising expenditures required to attain a foothold in the market); S. Pac.
Commc'ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[T]he need
for large capital outlays and lengthy construction programs in order to enter the market,
and the need to overcome brand preference established by the defendant's having been
first in the market or having made extensive 'image' advertising expenditures, also consti25, United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 95tute barriers to entry."); Complaint at
3055 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 1995), available at http://www.justice/gov/atr/cases/f0400/
0482.htm (concluding that " [ e ] stablishing a new successful brand of retail facial tissue in
the United States is difficult, time-consuming and costly[, as a]dvertising and promotional
expense for a new brand would exceed $25 million over a three-year introductory
period").
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Instead, under the Lanham Act, courts increasingly presume causation
and harm from intentional deception: "Such a presumption forces the
willful fabricator-rather than its intended victim-to bear the burden
of demonstrating that its deliberate misrepresentations did not result in
harm to its competitor. Thus, it discourages companies from engaging
in deliberately deceptive advertising campaigns, protecting consumers
and competitors alike."7 8 So courts under the Lanham Act legally presume harm from deliberately deceptive comparative advertising campaigns. But a smaller rival in a Sherman Act claim faces the opposite
presumption: it must first prove that it could not readily neutralize or
otherwise offset the monopolist's deception.
Finally, at times, smaller competitors may follow the monopolist's lead
by engaging in similar deception, rather than exposing it and facing the
monopolist's wrath. 9 Antitrust scholar Robert Steiner, who was also the
former president of the Kenner Products toy company, described his
concerns about the industry self-regulation of toy commercials in the
1960s and 1970s. Originally favoring industry self-policing, he feared the
greater anticompetitive consequences of deceptive advertising. Absent
regulation, some toy manufacturers would air deceptive ads, which
would pull down the toy industry. Unless his company matched "the
exaggerations and sometimes the outright deceptions of certain competitors, our commercials might not be exciting enough to move our
toys off the shelves."8 He foresaw bad commercials driving out the good
ones, rendering TV advertising relatively ineffective. 8' The Treatise does
not address this marketing dynamic. Instead it requires the injured con78

Trilink Saw Chain, LLC v. Blount, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
Cf ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 997 F.2d 949, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (remanding case in which district court granted, under the Lanham Act, victim's recovery of
$3.6 million in advertising costs to respond to competitor's deceptive advertising campaign, which cost only $2.2 million).
79See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 474 n.22 (1992).
The Court explained:
To inform consumers about Kodak, the competitor must be willing to forgo the
opportunity to reap supracompetitive prices in its own service and parts markets.
The competitor may anticipate that charging lower service and parts prices and
informing consumers about Kodak in the hopes of gaining future equipment
sales will cause Kodak to lower the price on its service and parts, canceling any
gains in equipment sales to the competitor and leaving both worse off. Thus, in
an equipment market with relatively few sellers, competitors may find it more
profitable to adopt Kodak's service and parts policy than to inform the
consumers.
Id.; see also Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 178 (6th Cir. 1941) (Ford following
industry leader General Motors in advertising a deceptive 6 percent financing plan).
80 Robert L. Steiner, Double Standards in the Regulation of Toy Advertising, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1259, 1264 (1988).
81 Id.
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sumers (who generally cannot challenge the deception under the Lanham Act) to show why competitors could not readily neutralize or offset
the misrepresentation.
III. A "QUICK-LOOK" STANDARD FOR EVALUATING
DECEPTIVE ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
A skeptic might agree that the Treatise's legal standard suffers from
infirmities, but conclude that it remains better than the lower courts'
rambling through the full-blown rule of reason analysis for Section 2
monopolization claims. 82 With the Treatise's standard, a defendant at
least can minimize discovery costs by limiting discovery to the Treatise's
elements. But there is an alternative to the Treatise's standard that minimizes the risks of false positives and false negatives. Courts can employ
this simpler legal standard: if a monopolist's deceit reasonably appears
capable of making a significant contribution to its attaining or maintaining monopoly power, then a prima facie violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act has been established.
There is little risk of false positives under this standard-the challenged behavior is socially undesirable (regardless of the offender's status). If a monopolist intentionally engages in independently wrongful
anticompetitive conduct, then courts need not assess the conduct's net
effect under a rule of reason standard. As a DOJ antitrust official during
the Kennedy administration said, "Realistically, the antitrust law is always
concerned with a pragmatic judgment about the reasonableness of trade
'
practices from the social viewpoint."83
In assessing the risks of false positives, competition authorities must distinguish between socially undesirable conduct generally and conduct that is undesirable only when
undertaken by a monopolist. For the former, there is little, if any, risk of
false positives. Society seeks to deter the conduct (such as deception,
physical violence, and other well-established tortious or illegal conduct)
generally. Overall it does not matter whether a monopolist or fringe
firm engages in such behavior. The issue is whether the victim can recover under the Sherman Act for such deceptive conduct.
But unlike a per se rule, a monopolist has greater flexibility in how it
chooses to defend itself under this prima facie standard. The plaintiff
must prove: first, that the company is a monopolist, second, that the
82 For greater detail on the shortcomings of the Supreme Court's rule of reason standard, its failure to provide a workable "quick-look" standard, and several ways to improve
the Court's antitrust's legal standards, see Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate
the Rule of Law, 42 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1375, pt. II.C (2009); Maurice E. Stucke, Should the
Government Prosecute Monopolies, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 497, 534-42.
83Lee Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23, 29 (1964).
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monopolist's conduct is actually deceptive, and third, causation-even if
the defendant's conduct is clearly or borderline deceptive, the plaintiff
still must establish that the monopolist's deception is capable of significantly contributing to its attaining or maintaining monopoly power.
This causation standard, which the D.C. Circuit employed in Microsoft,84
should address the "key problem" for the Treatise, namely "assessing the
connection between any improper representations and the speaker's
monopoly power."8 5 Consequently, the court can dismiss an antitrust
complaint that fails to adequately plead these elements. Even if the complaint survives a motion to dismiss, the court can lessen the discovery
expenses by limiting discovery initially to the second and third elements
(before addressing the issue of monopoly power and market definition).
This "quick-look" standard distinguishes antitrust violations from ordinary torts. A defamation action against Microsoft for content on its message board is not an antitrust action because the deceit is incapable of
significantly contributing to Microsoft's attaining or maintaining its monopoly.8 6 But when Microsoft deceived Java developers to thwart a competitive threat and maintain its monopoly, as the D.C. Circuit found, it
87
violated the Sherman Act.

This standard is administrable. Without expressly relying on the Treatise's legal standard, courts dismiss antitrust claims where the alleged
statements are not deceptive 88 or do not reasonably appear capable of
making a significant contribution to the defendant's maintaining or attaining monopoly power.8 9 There is no reason why this simpler standard
would not effectively mitigate the risks of false positives. For example,
courts in the three circuits that apply the Treatise's legal standard could

84 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

& HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
782b, at 327.
Eckert v. Microsoft Corp., No. 06-11888, 2007 WL 496692 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
87Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 76-77.
88See, e.g., Brookeside Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Walker Ambulance Serv., Inc., 39 F.3d
1181, 1994 WL 592941, at *3-*4 (6th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that deception could be
anticompetitive but finding no evidence that the defendant made alleged misrepresentations); Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, 916 F.2d 924, 930 (4th Cir. 1990); Picker Int'l v. Leavitt,
865 F. Supp. 951, 964-65 (D. Mass. 1994) (one negative statement to a customer was not
defamatory); EventMedia Int'l, Inc. v. Time Inc. Magazine Co., No. 92-0502, 1992 WL
321629 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F. Supp. 1155,
1182-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
89Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Kohler Co., 405 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (W.D. Wis. 2005)
(party conceded that allegedly misleading horsepower rating by itself did not violate antitrust laws); Picker lnt' 865 F. Supp. at 964 (no showing of causation as customer testified
that none of alleged monopolist's statements caused him to change his mind).
a

3B

86 See
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have easily dismissed those cases when the plaintiffs failed to present
evidence of actual deception.90
Not only is the standard easier to apply than the Treatise's six elements, it should yield more predictable results, as it requires less subjective input from the court. In applying the Treatise's elements, courts can
differ over whether the representation is "clearly" false or material (or
simply false and material), whether the length of time is sufficiently long
to constitute a "prolonged" period, or whether other competitors could
readily neutralize the falsehood (an inquiry that can potentially impose
needless discovery costs on third-party businesses).
While minimizing the risk of false positives, the proposed legal standard-compared to the Treatise's standard-reduces the risk of false
negatives and is consistent with the policy goals of the Sherman Act and
laws prohibiting deception generally. Other courts and the FIC 9 ' recognize that "fraudulent misrepresentations" to secure or maintain a monopoly violate the antitrust laws and should be punished. 92 Moreover, as
one court has recognized, the monopolist's deception should not be
but in the context of
viewed in isolation under the Treatisds elements,
93
behavior.
anticompetitive
alleged
other
the

90See, e.g., Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of
Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 2003); Kinderstart.com, LLC v.
Google, Inc., No. 06-2057, 2007 WL 831806, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Applera Corp. v. MJ
Research Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345-46 (D. Conn. 2004); Multivideo Labs., Inc. v.
Intel Corp., No. 99-3908, 2000 WL 12122, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
91Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975) (falsely disparaging competitive supplies were
among Xerox's anticompetitive practices to maintain its monopoly illegally) (consent
order).
92 See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395 (3d Cir. 2000); Int'l
Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1980) (upholding Sherman Act violation for deceptive marketing campaign to prevent travel group charters
from becoming a competitive threat); Caldon, Inc. v. Advanced Measurement & Analysis
Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 565 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (denying motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims that the defendant attained monopoly through deception); W. Duplicating,
Inc. v. Riso Kagaku Corp., No. 98-208, 2000 WL 1780288 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (monopolist's
fear, uncertainty, doubt (FUD) marketing campaign to discourage customers from buying competitor's ink and masters actionable under Sherman Act); Addamax Corp. v.
Open Software Found., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 274, 285 (D. Mass. 1995) (denying summary
judgment on allegations of FUD and vaporware campaign); Davis v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., No. 89-2839, 1994 WL 912242 (denying summary judgment on allegations of deception to maintain monopoly); Brownlee v. Applied Biosystems Inc., C 88 20672 RPA, 1989
WL 53864 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (denying motion to dismiss complaint alleging the defendants' deceit to potential customers and other third parties along with other anticompetitive conduct); Power Replacements Corp. v. Air Preheater Co., Inc., 356 F. Supp. 872, 897
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
93See Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (D. Utah 1999).
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Would the outcome differ if the court employs the Treatise's six elements or the simpler standard? If not, a skeptic may ask, why bother?
The outcome will depend at times on which standard the court employs,
so the ensuing results can be inconsistent. For example, in AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals,the district court concluded, in applying the Treatise's
elements, that doctors categorically could not be deceived. 94 But the
Third Circuit, on the facts of Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, con95
cluded that doctors could be deceived in at least some circumstances.
For over thirty years, DuPont's Coumadin product (its brand name for
warfarin sodium) dominated the oral, anti-coagulant market. DuPont,
however, anticipated losing market share from the introduction of a
cheaper generic drug substitute for Coumadin. The U.S. Food and Drug
Administration found that the generic drug was bioequivalent and therapeutically equivalent to DuPont's Coumadin. But to deter doctors,
pharmacists, third-party payors, and consumers from switching to the
generic drug, DuPont allegedly orchestrated a campaign disparaging generic substitutes generally and the plaintiffs warfarin sodium particularly. The alleged effect of DuPont's disparagement campaign was
allegedly to raise the generic manufacturer's costs to enter the anti-coagulant market and to thwart its market penetration.9 6 Despite pharmacists' and doctors' knowledge of the subject matter, some pharmacies,
including some large chains, allegedly refused to substitute the generic
for Coumadin out of a mistaken belief that generic warfarin sodium was
not equivalent to Coumadin-at least one physician's group instructed
its patients to take only the brand name Coumadin. 97 DuPont later setfled with the generic drug manufacturer98 and with a class of consumers
and third-party payors for $44.5 million. 99
94Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating that prescription drug sales "necessarily depended on prescriptions written by medical
professionals, that is, persons knowledgeable of the subject matter").
95See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 397 (3d Cir. 2000).
96In reWarfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 242 (D. Del. 2002). To show
that the defendant's misrepresentations had their desired effect, the
plaintiffs cited the weak market penetration of generic warfarin sodium. Generally about 40-70% of prescriptions for drugs available from multiple sources are
filled with less expensive generics within one year of generic availability....
However, more than 75% of prescriptions for sodium warfarin were still filled
with Coumadin a year after Barr introduced its generic version, and DuPont
continued to maintain a 67% market share up until the date the complaint was
filed.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
97Id.

98 Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 214 F.3d at 397 n.2.

9 Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 212 F.R.D. at 243. Another example is Caribbean
BroadcastingSystem v. Cable & Wireless, 148 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The plaintiffs radio
station entered the market to compete against the defendants' radio station in the East-
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IV. CONCLUSION
Prosecuting a monopolist's anticompetitive deceptive advertising or
product disparagement furthers the legislative aims of competition law.
Given deception's social and economic harms, its lack of redeeming economic benefits or cognizable efficiencies, and the importance of trust
in the marketplace, a hard line is. warranted.
The danger today is not that courts will punish deception under the
Sherman Act. Rather, the danger is that the courts will not. In advancing
their social policies on deceptive commercial speech and competition
generally, courts that do not punish a monopolist's anticompetitive deception contravene the Sherman Act's legislative aim. The legal standard in three circuits is based on the Treatise, but neither the Treatise's
de minimis presumption nor six elements are grounded in the Sherman
Act's text, legislative purpose, or legislative history. Instead, the standard
represents the views of several respected antitrust scholars. One jurist
(and believer in the Chicago School's economic theories) took a more
ern Caribbean. Id. at 1087. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, among other things,
deceived advertisers that their radio station's signal reached the entire Caribbean; therefore, advertisers need not deal with the new entrant. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' anticompetitive activities included (1) the defendants' "pervasive manipulation and
misuse of BVI regulatory processes through misrepresentations and sham objections to
the BVI authorities regarding CBS's license applications, particularly objections that C&W
knew or should have known were entirely baseless at the time they were asserted, all with
the purpose and effect of delaying CBS's entry into competition with CCC," and (2)
"CCC's pervasive misrepresentations to U.S. advertisers of Radio GEM's coverage and
reach, beginning prior to CBS's market entry and continuing to the present, all with the
purpose and effect of misleading said advertisers into establishing relationships with CCC
prior to CBS's market entry and foreclosing CBS from thereafter obtaining such relationships for CBS." Appellant Br., Caribbean Broadcasting System, 148 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1998). The defendants allegedly succeeded in blocking for over two years the plaintiff's
entry into the relevant Eastern Caribbean broadcasting market; the defendants used this
delay to establish their radio station as the dominant vehicle by which U.S. companies
advertised their goods in the Eastern Caribbean. The plaintiff alleged that U.S. advertisers
from the 1980s through the time of appeal in the late 1990s remained unaware of the
defendants' deception. Under the Treatise's presumption and six-element standard, the
monopolist need not have feared antitrust liability for its deception. No doubt the advertisers (which included Eastman Kodak, Johnson & Johnson, K-Mart, Radio Shack, and
Xerox) had knowledge about the relevant advertising market and the advertising vehicles
in those markets. These advertisers could have uncovered this deception by personally
touring (or surveying residents throughout) the Caribbean. In addition, the plaintiff
could have neutralized these misrepresentations. For example, the plaintiff could have
provided advertisers' survey data that showed that the defendants' radio station did not
reach the entire Caribbean. Moreover, after contractually securing the advertisers' business, the monopolist need not have continued its misrepresentations. Instead of dismissing the plaintiffs advertising claim, Judge Ginsburg, writing for the D.C. Circuit,
recognized that if the plaintiff proved at trial that the defendants' alleged conduct was
deceitful and anticompetitive, then such conduct fell within the category of anticompetitive conduct prohibited under the Sherman Act. CaribbeanBroadcastingSystem, 148 F.3d at
1087.
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extreme view. He assumed that the marketplace of ideas would cure a
monopolist's deceptive anticompetitive practices.10 0 The concern today
is not whether the courts should apply four or six elements. Courts simply should not erect legal presumptions that frustrate the Act's purpose.
The U.S. Supreme Court's rule of reason analysis generally, and its
monopolization standards specifically, lead to long litigation times, high
costs, and unpredictability. Ideally, enforcers could prosecute monopolistic conduct quickly as presumptively illegal without requiring the fullblown rule of reason analysis. Toward that end, competition authorities
should target a monopolist's anticompetitive deception, which courts
should treat as a prima facie violation of Section 2 without requiring a
full-blown rule of reason analysis or an arbitrary, multi-factor standard.

110
For example, in Schacharv. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., eight ophthalmologists contended that the defendant violated the antitrust laws by attaching the label "experimental" to radial keratotomy, a surgical procedure for correcting nearsightedness.
870 F.2d 397, 397 (7th Cir. 1989). The Seventh Circuit could have rejected summarily the
antitrust claim: the plaintiffs never demonstrated that the challenged statement was false.
Instead, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, asserted even if the statement were false
or misleading, the appropriate remedy "is not antitrust litigation but more speech-the
marketplace of ideas." Id. at 400. In another case, the plaintiff never showed that the
defendant even uttered the allegedly deceptive statements. But Judge Easterbrook, again
writing for the court, expanded on his social philosophies: False statements "justset the
stage for competition in a different venue: the advertising market." Sanderson v. Culligan
Int'l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005).

